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UNIVERSAL GÖDEL STATEMENTS AND COMPUTABILITY OF
INTELLIGENCE
YASHA SAVELYEV
Abstract. We show that there is a mathematical obstruction to complete Turing computability of
intelligence. This obstruction can be circumvented only if human reasoning is fundamentally unsound,
with the latter formally interpreted here as certain stable soundness. To this end, we first develop in
a specific setting a certain analogue of a Gödel statement, which has universality with respect to a
certain class of Turing machines / formal systems. As a partial consequence of this universality, this
Gödel statement, or Gödel string G as we call it in the language of Turing machines, does not require
soundness but only stable soundness. Moreover, this G is constructed explicitly, given the general
form of our class of Turing machines.
In what follows we understand human intelligence very much like Turing in [2], purely as a machine,
a black box which receives inputs and produces outputs. More specifically, this black box B is meant
to be some system which contains a human subject. We do not care about what is happening inside
B. So we are not directly concerned here with such intangible things as understanding, intuition,
consciousness - all the things that are valued of humans, and are supposed as special. The only thing
that concerns us is what output B produces given an input, it matters not in the present discussion
how it is produced. Given this very limited interpretation, the question that we are interested in is
this:
Question 1. Can human intelligence be completely modelled by a Turing machine?
An informal definition of a Turing machine (see [1]) is as follows: it is an abstract machine which
permits certain inputs, and produces outputs. The outputs are determined from the inputs by a
fixed finite algorithm, defined in a certain precise sense. For a non-expert reader we point out that
this “fixed” does not preclude the algorithm from “learning”, it just means that how it “learns” is
completely determined by the initial algorithm. In particular anything that can be computed by
computers as we know them can be computed by a Turing machine. For our purposes the reader may
simply understand a Turing machine as a digital computer with unbounded memory running some
particular program. Unbounded memory is just a mathematical convenience. In specific arguments,
also of the kind we make, we can work with non-explicitly bounded memory.
Turing himself has started on a form of Question 1 in his “Computing machines and Intelligence”,
[2], where he also informally outlined a possible obstruction to a yes answer coming from Gödel’s
incompleteness theorem.
For the incompleteness theorem to have any relevance, we need some assumption on the soundness
or consistency of human reasoning. Informally, a human is sound if whenever they asserts something in
absolute faith, this something is indeed true. This requires context, as truth in general is undefinable.
For our arguments later on the context will be in certain mathematical models. However, we cannot
honestly hope for soundness, as even mathematicians are not on the surface sound at all times, they
may assert mathematical untruths at various times, (but usually not in absolute faith). But we can
certainly hope for some kind of fundamental soundness.
In this work we will formally interpret fundamental soundness as stable soundness. Essentially, our
machine B is now allowed to make corrections, and if a statement printed by B is never corrected, then
this statement is true, if B has our stable soundness property. This reflects our basic understanding of
how science progresses. Of course even stable soundness needs idealizations to make sense for humans.
The human brain deteriorates, and eventually fails, so that either we idealize the human brain to never
deteriorate, or B now refers not to an individual human but to the evolving scientific community.
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Around the same time as Turing, Gödel argued for a no answer to Question 1, see [12, 310], relating
the question to existence of absolutely undecidable problems, see also Feferman [7] for a discussion.
Since existence of absolutely undecidable problems is such a difficult and contentious issue, even
if Gödel’s argument is in essence correct it is not completely compelling. Interestingly, for Gödel,
fundamental unsoundness of human reasoning is not even a possibility, it does not seem to be stated
in [12].
Later Lucas [11] and later again and more robustly Penrose [17] argued for a no answer based only
on soundness, and by further elaborating the obstruction from the Gödel incompleteness theorem.
Such an argument if correct would be much more compelling, we review it shortly, and outline its
issues.
It should also be noted that for Penrose in particular, non-computability of intelligence is evidence
for new physics, and he has specific and very intriguing proposals with Hameroff [10], on how this can
take place in the human brain. Here is also a partial list of some partially related work on mathematical
models of brain activity and or quantum collapse models: [13], [16], [8], [9].
The arguments of Penrose and Lucas have well known issues, which we intend to completely resolve
here. The following is a slightly informal version of our main Theorem 4.2.
Theorem 0.1. Either there are cognitively meaningful, absolutely non Turing computable processes in
the human brain, or human beings are fundamentally unsound. This theorem is indeed a mathematical
fact, after formally interpreting fundamental soundness as stable soundness, and after interpreting
human beings in the context of a certain idealization, already partly described above.
By absolutely we mean in any physical model. Note that even existence of absolutely non Turing
computable processes in nature is not known. For example we expect beyond reasonable doubt that
solutions of fluid flow or N -body problems are generally non Turing computable, (over Z, if not over
R cf. [3]), as modeled in essentially classical mechanics. But in a more physically accurate and funda-
mental model they may both become computable, possibly if the nature of the universe is ultimately
discreet. It would be good to compare this theorem this with Deutch [6], where computability of any
suitably finite and discreet physical system is conjectured. Although this is not immediately at odds
with us, as the hypothesis of that conjecture may certainly not be satisfiable.
By strengthening the hypothesis of Theorem 0.1, from computability to provable computability of a
subject by a particular Turing machine, as in Theorem 5.2, we can obtain more practical consequences.
To the effect that not only is our subject stably unsound, but must in fact eventually stably assert
0 = 1.
The Lucas-Penrose argument. Following Lucas [11], Penrose has given variations of the argument
for a no answer to Question 1 in his books [17], [18]. The final argument can be found in [19], and
it goes roughly as follows. Loosely, a formal system consists of a language: alphabet and grammar, a
collection of sentences in this language understood as axioms, and finally a deductive system. Given
a formal system F the statement ΘF :
I am F ,
will mean that any statement in arithmetic that I assert to be true is provable in F , e.g. “There are
infinitely many primes.” may be such a statement. The statement ΘF for an F satisfying certain
properties is equivalent to me being computable as a machine printing statements in arithmetic. We
will call such an F good. 1 So we suppose from now on that F is good, since computability is what
we are interested in.
Now I assert I am consistent, which entails more specifically that I assert:
(0.2) If ΘF then F is consistent.
We ignore for now whether asserting self-consistency is rational. By F being consistent we just mean
that the formal system F does not prove a statement and its logical negation. Now, the celebrated
1Explicitly, it is a condition for the axioms of F being recursively enumerable, plus another minor condition on F
being able to prove enough basic things about numbers.
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Gödel incompleteness theorem says that for F good and consistent, there is a statement G(F) which
is true, but cannot be proved by F . As I assert (0.2) then I also assert by implication IF :
If ΘF then G(F).
If I assert G(F), then this would be a contradiction to either my consistency or to ΘF , since G(F)
is something that F cannot prove. Unfortunately I cannot rationally assert G(F), since I don’t know
ΘF . I only assert IF , so there is no contradiction here. But we may try to fix this idea as follows. For
this fix we need to get a bit more technical.
0.1. Outline of a partial fix of the Lucas-Penrose argument. While this outline uses some of
the language of formal systems, we will not use this language in our main argument, which is based
purely on the language of Turing machines, and is much more elementary. Nevertheless, the form of
this outline is somewhat close to our actual argument, so reviewing this may give the reader some idea
of our plan.
Say now P is in contact with experimenter/operator E. The input strings that E gives P are pairs
(ΣT , n) for ΣT specification of a Turing machines T , and n ∈ N.
Let ΘT be the statement:
(0.3) T computes P.
For each (ΣT , n), P prints his statement P (ΣT , n), which he asserts to hold if ΘT holds. We ask that for
each fixed T : {P (ΣT , n)}n is the complete list of statements that P asserts to be true conditionally on
ΘT . Finally, we put the condition on our P that he asserts himself to be consistent. More specifically,
P asserts for each T the statement IT :
(0.4) ΘT =⇒ T is consistent.
By T being consistent we mean here:
T (ΣT , n) 6= ¬(T (ΣT ,m)),
for any n,m with ¬ the logical negation of the statement, and where inequality is just string inequality
of the corresponding sentences.
Let then T0 be a specified Turing machine, and suppose that E passes to P input of the form
(ΣT0 , n). Now, as is well known
2, the statements {T0(ΣT0 , n)}n must be the complete list of provable
statements in a certain formal system F(T0) explicitly constructible given T0. And F(T0) would be
consistent if ΘT0 and if IT0 . In particular if ΘT0 and if IT0 , then there would be a true (in the standard
model of arithmetic) Gödel statement G(T0) for this F(T0), such that
T0(ΣT0 , n) 6= G(T0),
for all n.
But P asserts IT0 , hence he must assert by implication that
ΘT0 =⇒ G(T0).
And so if P knew how to construct G(T0) then this statement must be in the list {P (ΣT0 , n)}n, and
so in the list {T0(ΣT0 , n)}n, so we would get a contradiction.
Direct constructibility of G(T0) by P is likely not an issue, since the formal system F(T0) is after
all known to P . But this is a potential problem best studied by an expert logician. So assuming G(T0)
is indeed constructible by P , we conclude that either not ΘT0 , that is P is not computed by T0 or P
is not consistent, but T0 is arbitrary so we obtain an obstruction to computability of P .
The above outline is at best only a partial fix, because all it claims to prove is: either we are
non-computable or inconsistent, which we appear to be anyway. Of course as we have argued we must
talk of fundamental soundness/consistency. But then the argument cannot work exactly as above,
since Gödel’s theorem necessitates total consistency. We will delve no further into critiquing the
Lucas-Penrose argument. One such critique is given in Koellner [14], [15], see also Penrose [19], and
2I don’t know a standard reference but see for example [7].
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Chalmers [4] for discussions of some issues. Note of course that our argument (the partial fix) above
is significantly different, and so the issues are different.
So motivated by the discussion above, the ideal thing to do is to formally define fundamental
soundness and construct a new type of Gödel statements, which works under this weaker hypothesis.
This is actually what we will do, in the limited setting above. We completely solve both problems
mentioned above: formally defining fundamental soundness in terms of a certain notion of stable
soundness, and explicit construction of the “Gödel statement”, which crucially works under this stable
soundness hypothesis. See the preamble to Section 3 to get a more precise idea for the meaning of
stable soundness.
To this end, we reformulate the above idea using a more elementary approach, more heavily based
in Turing machines. Then we partially define our subject, henceforth denoted by S, by means of
formalizing properties of a certain function associated to S. We do this so that a certain analogue of
the Gödel statement can be readily constructed directly, avoiding the general incompleteness theorem.
This will not be exactly “Gödel statement”, but rather a “Gödel string” as we call it, because for
the main result we will not even be dealing with formal systems, but purely with Turing machines.
But this string has analogous properties, and some additional ones, like a certain universality, and
applicability to stably sound systems.
As a final remark, technically the paper is mostly elementary, and should be widely readable in
entirety.
1. Some preliminaries
This section can be just skimmed on a first reading. Really what we are interested in is not Turing
machines per se, but computations that can be simulated by Turing machine computations. These
can for example be computations that a mathematician performs with paper and pencil, and indeed
is the original motivation for Turing’s specific model. However to introduce Turing computations we
need Turing machines, here is our version which is a computationally equivalent, minor variation of
Turing’s original machine.
Definition 1.1. A Turing machine M consists of:
• Three infinite (1-dimensional) tapes Ti, To, Tc, (input, output and computation) divided into
discreet cells, next to each other. Each cell contains a symbol from some finite alphabet Γ. A
special symbol b ∈ Γ for blank, (the only symbol which may appear infinitely many often).
• Three heads Hi,Ho,Hc (pointing devices), Hi can read each cell in Ti to which it points, Ho,Hc
can read/write each cell in To, Tc to which they point. The heads can then move left or right
on the tape.
• A set of internal states Q, among these is “start” state q0. And a non-empty set F ⊂ Q of
final states.
• Input string Σ: the collection of symbols on the tape Ti, so that to the left and right of Σ there
are only symbols b. We assume that in state q0 Hi points to the beginning of the input string,
and that the Tc, To have only b symbols.
• A finite set of instructions: I, that given the state q the machine is in currently, and given the
symbols the heads are pointing to, tells M to do the following, the taken actions 1-3 below will
be (jointly) called an executed instruction set, or just step:
(1) Replace symbols with another symbol in the cells to which the heads Hc,Ho point (or leave
them).
(2) Move each head Hi,Hc,Ho left, right, or leave it in place, (independently).
(3) Change state q to another state or keep it.
• Output string Σout, the collection of symbols on the tape To, so that to the left and right of
Σout there are only symbols b, when the machine state is final. When the internal state is one
of the final states we ask that the instructions are to do nothing, so that these are frozen states.
Definition 1.2. A complete configuration of a Turing machine M or total state is the collection
of all current symbols on the tapes, position of the heads, and current internal state. Given a total
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state s, δ(s) will denote the successor state of s, obtained by executing the instructions set of M on s,
or in other words δ(s) is one step forward from s.
So a Turing machine determines a special kind of function:
δM : C(M)→ C(M),
where C(M) is the set of possible total states of M .
Definition 1.3. A Turing computation, or computation sequence for M is a possibly not
eventually constant sequence
∗M(Σ) := {si}i=∞i=0
of total states of M , determined by the input Σ and M , with s0 the initial configuration whose internal
state is q0, and where si+1 = δ(si). If elements of {si}i=∞i=0 are eventually in some final machine state,
so that the sequence is eventually constant, then we say that the computation halts. In this case we
denote by sf the final configuration, so that the sequence is eventually constant with terms sf . We
define the length of a computation sequence to be the first occurrence of n > 0 s.t. sn = sf . For a
given Turing computation ∗M(Σ), we will write
∗M(Σ)→ x,
if ∗M(Σ) halts and x is the output string.
We write M(Σ) for the output string of M , given the input string Σ, if the associated Turing
computation ∗M(Σ) halts.
Definition 1.4. Let Strings denote the set of all finite strings, including the empty string , of symbols
in some fixed finite alphabet, with at least 2 elements, for example {0, 1}. Given a partial function
f : Strings → Strings, that is a function defined on some subset of Strings - we say that a Turing
machine M computes f if ∗M(Σ)→ f(Σ), whenever f(Σ) is defined.
So a Turing machine T itself determines a partial function, which is defined on all Σ ∈ Strings s.t.
∗T (Σ) halts, by Σ 7→ T (Σ). The following definition is purely for writing purposes.
Definition 1.5. Given Turing computations (for possibly distinct Turing machines) ∗T1(Σ1), ∗T2(Σ2)
we say that they are equivalent if they both halt with the same output string or both do not halt. We
write T1(Σ1) = T2(Σ2) if ∗T1(Σ1), ∗T2(Σ2) both halt with the same value.
In practice we will allow our Turing machine T to reject some elements of Strings as valid input.
We may formalize this by asking that there is a special final machine state qreject, so that T (Σ) halts
with qreject for
Σ /∈ I ⊂ Strings,
where I is some set of all valid, that is T -permissible input strings. We do not ask that for Σ ∈ I
∗T (Σ) halts. If ∗T (Σ) does halt then we will say that Σ is T -acceptable. It will be convenient to
forget qreject and instead write
T : I → O,
where I ⊂ Strings is understood as the subset of all T -permissible strings, or just input set and O
is the set output strings or output set.
We will sometimes use abstract sets to refer to input and output sets. However, these are understood
to be subsets of Strings under some implicit, fixed encoding. Concretely an encoding of A is an
injective set map i : A → Strings. For example if the input set is Strings2, we may encode it as a
subset of Strings as follows. The encoding string of Σ ∈ Strings2 will be of the type: “this string
encodes an element Strings2, whose components are Σ1 and Σ2.” In particular the sets of integers
N,Z, which we use often, will under some encoding correspond to subsets of Strings. Indeed this
abstracting of sets from their encoding in Strings is partly what computer languages do. The fixing
of the encoding can be understood as fixing the computer language.
The above will allow us to work with a set T of Turing machines, with abstract sets of inputs and
outputs implicitly encoded as subsets of Strings as above. Note T itself has an induced encoding. Of
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course, concretely T is nothing more then the set of Turing machines, with a distinguished final state
called qreject.
Definition 1.6. We say that a Turing machine T computes a partial function f : I → J , if I is
contained in the set of permissible inputs of T and ∗T (Σ) → f(Σ), whenever f(Σ) is defined, for
Σ ∈ I.
Given Turing machines
M1 : I → O,M2 : J → P,
we may naturally compose them to get a Turing machine M2 ◦M1 : C → P , for C = M−11 (O ∩ J),
(O ∩ J is understood as intersection of subsets of Strings). C can be empty in which case this is a
Turing machine which rejects all input. Let us not elaborate further.
1.1. Join of Turing machines. Our Turing machine of Definition 1.1 is a multi-tape enhancement
of a more basic notion of a Turing machine with a single tape, but we need to iterate this further.
We replace a single tape by tapes T 1, . . . , Tn in parallel, which we denote by (T 1 . . . Tn) and call
this n-tape. The head H on the n-tape has components Hi pointing on the corresponding tape T i.
When moving a head we move all of its components separately. A string of symbols on (T 1 . . . Tn) is
an n-string, formally just an element Σ ∈ Stringsn, with i’th component of Σ specifying a string of
symbols on T i. The blank symbol b is the symbol (b1, . . . , bn) with bi blank symbols of T i.
Given Turing machines M1,M2 we can construct what we call a join M1 ?M2, which is roughly a
Turing machine where we alternate the operations ofM1,M2. In what follows symbols with superscript
1, 2 denote the corresponding objects of M1, respectively M2, cf. Definition 1.1.
M1 ? M2 has three 2-tapes:
(T 1i T
2
i ), (T
1
c T
2
c ), (T
1
o T
2
o ),
three heads Hi,Hc,Ho which have component heads H
j
i ,H
j
c ,H
j
o , j = 1, 2. It has machine states:
QM1?M2 = Q
1 ×Q2 × (Z2 = {0, 1}),
with initial state (q10 , q
2
0 , 0) and final states:
FM1?M2 = F
1 ×Q2 × {1} unionsqQ1 × F 2 × {0}.
Clearly we have a natural splitting
C(M1 ? M2) = C(M1)× C(M2)× Z2.
In terms of this splitting we define the transition function
δM
1?M2 : C(M1 ? M2)→ C(M1 ? M2),
for our Turing machine M1 ? M2 by:
δM
1?M2(s1, s2, 0) = (δM
1
(s1), s
2, 1)),
δM
1?M2(s1, s2, 1) = (s1, δ
M2(s2), 0)).
Or, concretely this means the following. Given machine state q = (q1, q2, 0) and the symbols
(σ1i σ
2
i ), (σ
1
cσ
2
c ), (σ
1
oσ
2
o)
to which the heads Hi,Hc,Ho are currently pointing, we first check instructions in I1 for q1, σ1i , σ
1
c , σ
1
o ,
and given those instructions as step 1 execute:
(1) Replace symbols σ1c , σ
1
o to which the head components H
1
c ,H
1
o point, or leave them unchanged,
while leaving unchanged the symbols to which H2c ,H
2
o point.
(2) Move each head component H1i ,H
1
c ,H
1
o left, right, or leave it in place, (independently). (The
second components of the heads are unchanged.)
(3) Change the first component of q to another machine state in Q1 or keep it, based on the
instruction in I1. Leave the second component of q unchanged. The third component of q is
changed to 1.
UNIVERSAL GÖDEL STATEMENTS AND COMPUTABILITY OF INTELLIGENCE 7
Then likewise given machine state q = (q1, q2, 1), we check instructions in I2 for q2, σ2i , σ
2
c , σ
2
o and
given those instructions as step 2 execute:
(1) Replace symbols σ2c , σ
2
o to which the head components H
2
c ,H
2
o point, or leave them unchanged,
while leaving unchanged the symbols to which H1c ,H
1
o point.
(2) Move each head component H2i ,H
2
c ,H
2
o left, right, or leave it in place.
(3) Change the second component of q to another or keep it, based on instruction in I2. Leave
the first component unchanged, and change the third component of q to 0.
1.1.1. Input. The input for M1 ? M2 is a 2-string or in other words pair (Σ1,Σ2), with Σ1 an input
string for M1, and Σ2 an input string for M2.
1.1.2. Output. The output for
∗M1 ? M2(Σ1,Σ2)
is defined as follows. If this computation halts then the 2-tape (T 1o T
2
o ) contains a 2-string, bounded
by b symbols, with T 1o component Σ
1
o and T
2
o component Σ
2
o. Then the output M
1 ? M2(Σ1,Σ2) is
defined to be Σ1o if the final state is of the form (qf , q, 1) for qf final, or Σ
2
o if the final state is of the
form (q, qf , 0), for qf likewise final.
1.2. Universality. It will be convenient to refer to the universal Turing machine
U : T × Strings→ Strings,
for T the set of Turing machines as already indicated above. This universal Turing machine already
appears in Turing’s [1]. It permits as input a pair (T,Σ) for T an encoding of a Turing machine and
Σ input to this T . It can be partially characterized by the property that for every Turing machine T
and string Σ we have:
∗T (Σ) is equivalent to ∗ U(T,Σ).
1.3. Notation. In what follows Z is the set of all integers and N non-negative integers. We will
sometimes specify a Turing machine simply by specifying a function
T : I → O,
with the full data of the underlying Turing machine being implicitly specified, in a way that should be
clear from context. When we intend to suppress dependence of a variable V on some parameter p we
often write V = V (p), this equality is then an equality of notation not of mathematical objects.
2. Preliminary setup for the proof of Theorem 0.1
This section can be understood to be a warm up, as we will not yet work with stable soundness.
But most of this will carry on to the more technical setup of Section 3.
Definition 2.1. A machine will be a synonym for a partial function A : I → O, with I,O abstract
sets with a fixed, prescribed encoding as subsets of Strings, (cf. Preliminaries).
M will denote the set of machines. Given a Turing machine T : I → O, we have an associated
machine fog(T ) by forgetting all structure except the structure of a partial function. T will denote
the set of machines, which in addition have the structure of a Turing machine. So we have a forgetful
map fog : T →M.
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2.1. Diagonalization machines. There is a well known connection between Turing machines and
formal systems to which we already alluded in Section 0.1. So Gödel statements can already be
interpreted in Turing machine language as certain Gödel strings. But we will be aiming to construct,
in a specific setting relevant to our goals, a more flexible and in a certain sense universal (for our
class of Turing machines) such Gödel string G. Extending this construction to more general classes of
Turing machines / formal systems would be very interesting, but at the moment it is not clear what
that would entail.
To make this G exceptionally simple we will need to formulate some specific properties for our
machines, which will require a bit of setup. We denote by TZ ⊂ T the subset of Turing machines of
the type:
X : (SX × N ⊂ Strings× N)→ Z.
In other words, the input set of X ∈ TZ is of the form SX × N, for SX ⊂ Strings, and the output set
of X is Z.
Let O ⊂ TZ × Strings consist of (X,Σ) ∈ TZ × Strings with Σ ∈ SX , defined as above. And set
O′ := O × N ⊂ TZ × Strings× N.
Let
D1 : Z unionsq {∞} → Z,
be a fixed Turing machine which satisfies
D1(x) = x+ 1 if x ∈ Z ⊂ Z unionsq {∞}(2.2)
D1(∞) = 1.(2.3)
Here {∞} is the one point set containing the element ∞, which is just a particular distinguished
symbol, also implicitly encoded as an element of Strings, s.t. {∞} ∩ Z = ∅, where the intersection
is taken in Strings. In what follows we sometimes understand D1 as an element of TZ, denoting the
Turing machine:
(2.4) (x,m) 7→ D1(x),
for all (x,m) ∈ (Z unionsq {∞})× N.
We need one more Turing machine.
Definition 2.5. We say that a Turing machine
R : D ⊃ O′ → Z unionsq {∞},
has property G if the following is satisfied:
• R halts on the entire O′, that is O′ is contained in the set of R-acceptable strings.
• R(X,Σ,m) 6=∞ =⇒ R(X,Σ,m) = X(Σ,m), for (Σ,m) ∈ SX × N, and X ∈ TZ.
• ∀m : R(D1,∞,m) 6=∞, and so ∀m : R(D1,∞,m) = 1, by the previous property.
Lemma 2.6. There is a Turing machine R satisfying property G.
Proof. Let Wn be some Turing machine Wn : {} → {∞}, for  ∈ Strings the empty string. So as
a function it is not very interesting since the input and output sets are singletons. We ask that the
length of ∗Wn() is n > 0, (cf. Preliminaries). Let Rn be the Turing machine, specified as
Rn(Z) =Wn ? U(, Z),
in the language of the join operation described in Section 1, for Z ∈ Strings, and for U the universal
Turing machine. Clearly Rn always halts, although it may halt with machine state qreject. Moreover
by construction every Z = (X,Σ,m) ∈ O′ ⊂ Strings is permitted. Additionally, for (X,Σ,m) ∈ O′,
Rn(X,Σ,m) 6=∞ =⇒ Rn(X,Σ,m) = X(Σ,m),
in particular every (X,Σ,m) ∈ O′ is Rn-acceptable. As a function Z unionsq {∞} → Z, D1 is completely
determined but it could have various implementations as a Turing machine, so that the length lm of
∗D1(∞,m) depends on this implementation. Clearly we may assume that ∀m : l = lm for some l, by
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definition of D1 as an element of TZ, as in (2.4). We then ask that n0 > l is fixed. Then by construction
we get:
∀m : Rn0(D1,∞,m) = D1(∞,m) = 1.
So set R := Rn0 , and this gives the desired Turing machine. Note that the domain D ⊂ T × Strings
of R-permissible strings is not explicitly determined by our construction, as we cannot tell without
additional information when a general Z is rejected by R. We can only say that D ⊃ O′. 
DefineM0 to be the set of machines whose input set is I = T ×N and whose output set is Strings.
That is
M0 := {M ∈M|M : T × N→ Strings}.
We set
T0 := {T ∈ T |fog(T ) ∈M0},
and we set I0 := T0 × N. Given M ∈M0 and M ′ ∈ T0 let ΘM,M ′ be the statement:
M is computed by M ′.(2.7)
For each M ∈M0, we define a machine:
M˜ : I → Strings× N
(2.8) M˜(B,m) = (M(B,m),m),
which is naturally a Turing machine when M is a Turing machine.
In what follows when we write M ′(M ′,m) we mean M ′(ΣM ′ ,m) for ΣM ′ the string encoding of the
specification of the Turing machine M ′. So we conflate the notation for the Turing machine and its
string specification.
Definition 2.9. For M ∈ M0, M ′ ∈ T0, an abstract string O ∈ Strings is said to have property
C = C(M,M ′) if:
ΘM,M ′ =⇒ ∀m : (∗M ′(M ′,m) does not halt) ∨ (M ′(M ′,m) /∈ O)
∨ (M ′(M ′,m) ∈ O, O ∈ O and X(Σ,m) = D1 ◦R ◦ M˜ ′(M ′,m), where (X,Σ) = O),
and where M˜ ′ is determined by M ′ as in (2.8).
At a glance, this is a somewhat complicated property, but essentially it just says that if ΘM,M ′ then
for all m “O 6= M ′(M ′,m)” unless either ∗M ′(M ′,m) does not halt, or the output does not have the
right (data) type, or R(O,m) = ∞. Thus the string O with property C(M,M ′) is “diagonal” in a
certain sense, where by “diagonal” we mean that something analogous to Cantor’s diagonalization is
happening, but we will not elaborate.
Remark 2.10. The fact that data types get intricated is perhaps not surprising. On one hand there
is a well known correspondence, the Curry-Howard correspondence [5], between proof theory in logic
and type theory in computer science, and on the other hand we are doing something at least loosely
related to Gödel incompleteness, but in the language of Turing machines.
Definition 2.11. We say that M ∈ M0 is C-sound if for each (M ′,m) ∈ I0, with M(M ′,m) = O
defined, O has property C(M,M ′). We say that M is C-sound on M ′ if the list {M(M ′,m)}m has
only elements with property C(M,M ′).
Define a C-sound M ′ ∈ T0 analogously.
Definition 2.12. If M,M ′ as above are C-sound we will say that sound(M), sound(M ′) hold. If M
is C-sound on M ′ we say that sound(M,M ′) holds.
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Example 1. A trivially C-sound machine M is one for which
M(M ′,m) = (D1 ◦R ◦ M˜ ′,M ′)
for every (M ′,m) ∈ I. As (D1 ◦R ◦ M˜ ′,M ′) automatically has property C(M,M ′) for each M ′ ∈ T0.
In general, for any M ∈ M0, M ′ ∈ T0 the list of all strings O with property C(M,M ′) is always
infinite, as by this example there is at least one such string (D1 ◦ R ◦ M˜ ′,M ′), which can then be
modified to produce infinitely many such strings.
Theorem 2.13. If sound(M,M ′) ∧ΘM,M ′ then
∀m :M(M ′,m) 6= (D1,∞).
On the other hand, if sound(M,M ′) then the string
G := (D1,∞) ∈ O
has property C(M,M ′). In particular if sound(M) then G has property C(M,M ′) for all M ′.
So given any C-sound M ∈M0 there is a certain string G with property C(M,M ′) for all M ′, such
that for each M ′ if ΘM,M ′ then
G 6=M(M ′,m),
for all m. This “Gödel string” G is what we are going to use further on. What makes G particularly
suitable for our application, is that it is independent of the particulars of M , all that is needed is
M∈M0 and is C-sound. So G is in a sense universal.
Proof. Suppose not and let M ′0 be such that ΘM,M ′0 ∧ sound(M,M ′0) and such that
M(M ′0,m0) = G for some m0,
so that G has property C(M,M ′). Set I = (M ′0,m0) then we have that:
1 = D1(∞,m0),
D1(∞,m0) = D1 ◦R ◦ M˜ ′(I), by G having property C(M,M ′), and by ∗M ′(I)→ G ∈ O since ΘM,M ′ ,
D1 ◦R ◦ M˜ ′(I) = D1 ◦R(D1,∞,m0) by M ′(I) = G,
D1 ◦R(D1,∞,m0) = 2 by property G of R and by (2.2),
1 = 2.
So we obtain a contradiction.
We now verify the second part of the theorem. Given M ′ ∈ T0, we show that:
(2.14) ∀m :
(
sound(M,M ′) ∧ (M ′(I) ∈ O) ∧ΘM,M ′ =⇒ R(M˜ ′(I)) =∞
)
,
where I = (M ′,m). Suppose otherwise that for some m0 and I0 = (M ′,m0) we have:
sound(M,M ′) ∧ (∗M ′(I0) halts) ∧ (M ′(I0) ∈ O) ∧ΘM,M ′ ∧ (R(M˜ ′(I0)) 6=∞).
So we have:
(2.15) ∗M ′(I0)→ (X,Σ) ∈ O,
for some (X,Σ) having property C(M,M ′). And so, since R is defined on all of O′:
R(M˜ ′(I0)) = R(X,Σ,m0) = X(Σ,m0) = x ∈ Z, for some x,
by Property G of R and by R(M˜ ′(I0)) 6=∞.
Then we get:
x = X(Σ,m0) = D1 ◦R ◦ M˜ ′(I0) = D1(x) = x+ 1
by (X,Σ) having property C(M,M ′), and by (2.15). So we get a contradiction and (2.14) follows. Our
conclusion readily follows. 
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2.2. A system with a human subject S as a machine in M0. Let S be a human subject, in
an isolated environment, in communication with an experimenter/operator E that as input passes to
S elements of I = T × N. Here isolated environment means primarily that no information i.e.
stimulus, that is not explicitly controlled by E and that is usable by S, passes to S while he is in this
environment. For practical purposes S has in his environment a general purpose digital computer with
arbitrarily, as necessary, expendable memory, (in other words a universal Turing machine).
We suppose that upon receiving any I ∈ I, as a string in his computer, after possibly using his
computer in some way, S instructs his computer to print after some indeterminate time a string S(I).
We are not actually assuming that S(I) is defined on every I, (although this would likely be a safe
assumption). So S, in our language, also denotes a machine:
S : I → Strings.
Definition 2.16. We say that S the human subject is computable if the corresponding machine S
above is computable.
Additional conditions for S. We now consider a more specific S0 of the type above, which additionally
behaves in the following way. For any fixed T ∈ T0
{S0(T,m)}m
is the complete list of strings that S0 asserts to have property C(S0, T ). Of course we don’t actually
need S0 to list infinitely many strings, we only need that S0 can list as many strings as we like, and
that given any particular T , eventually any particular string that S0 asserts to have property C(S0, T )
will appear. Also as in the Penrose argument we ask that S0 asserts that he is sound, which entails
in this case that he asserts sound(S0) for S0 the above machine. This is preliminary, since asserting
soundness is at least on the surface irrational, and we formally treat fundamental soundness only in
the next section.
Theorem 2.17.
S0 is computable =⇒ ¬sound(S0).
In fact we prove more, for any S′ ∈ T0:
ΘS0,S′ =⇒ ¬sound(S0, S′).
This partly formalizes Theorem 0.1, to completely formalize it we must wait till the following
sections.
Proof. Suppose ΘS0,S′ for some S
′ ∈ T0. Suppose in addition sound(S0, S′). Then by Theorem 2.13
S0(S
′,m) 6= (D1,∞)
for any m. On the other hand S0 asserts sound(S0) and hence must assert that (D1,∞) has property
C(S0, S
′), by the second half of Theorem 2.13. In particular the string (D1,∞) must be in the list
{S0(S′,m)}m, since this list is assumed to be complete. So we have reached a contradiction. 
3. Fundamental soundness as stable soundness
Imagine a machine P which sequentially prints statements of arithmetic, which it asserts are true,
but so that P can also delete a printed statement, if P decided the statement to be untrue. We say
that P is stably sound if any printed statement by P that survives to infinity is in fact true. More
formally, for each n ∈ N, P (n) will correspond to an operation denoted by the string (Σ,+) or (Σ,−)
meaning add Σ to the list or remove Σ from list, respectively, where Σ is a statement of arithmetic.
If there is an n0 with P (n0) = (Σ,+), s.t. there is no m > n0 with P (m) = (Σ,−), then Σ is called
P -stable and we say that P prints Σ stably.
Definition 3.1. We say that P is stably sound if every P -stable Σ is true.
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We now translate this to our setting. The crucial point of our Gödel string is that it will still
function in this stable soundness context. Let M± denote the set of machines
M : I = T × N→ Strings× {±},
where {±} is the set containing two symbols +,−, likewise implicitly encoded as a subset of Strings.
We set
T ± := {T ∈ T |fog(T ) ∈M±}.
Definition 3.2. For M ∈ M±, and for (T,m) ∈ I, we say that an abstract O ∈ Strings is
(M,T )-stable, and that M prints O T -stably if there exists an m ∈ N s.t. M(T,m) = (O,+)
and there is no k > m s.t. M(T, k) = (O,−). When T ∈ T ± and fog(T ) = M , instead of writing
(M,T )-stable we just write T -stable.
Let
pr : Strings× {±} → Strings,
be the natural projection. For each M ∈M±, we define a machine:
M˜ : I → Strings× N,
(3.3) M˜(T,m) = (pr ◦M(T,m),m),
which is naturally a Turing machine when M is a Turing machine.
In what follows O ⊂ TZ × Strings is as before.
Definition 3.4. For M ∈ M±, M ′ ∈ T ±, an abstract string O ∈ Strings is said to have property
sC = sC(M,M ′) if:
ΘM,M ′ =⇒ ∀m : (∗M ′(M ′,m) does not halt) ∨ (pr ◦M ′(M ′,m) /∈ O) ∨ (pr ◦M ′(M ′,m) is not M ′-stable)
∨ (pr ◦M ′(M ′,m) ∈ O, O ∈ O and X(Σ,m) = D1 ◦R ◦ M˜ ′(M ′,m), where (X,Σ) = O)),
for M˜ ′ determined by M ′ as in (3.3).
Definition 3.5. We say thatM ∈M± is stably C-sound onM ′, and we write that s−sound(M,M ′)
holds, if every (M,M ′)-stable O has property sC(M,M ′). We say that M is stably C-sound if it is
stably C-sound on all M ′, and in this case we write that s− sound(M) holds.
Example 2. As before an example of a trivially stably C-sound machine M is one for which
M(M ′,m) = (D1 ◦R ◦ M˜ ′,M ′,+)
for every (M ′,m) ∈ I.
Theorem 3.6. If s− sound(M,M ′) ∧ΘM,M ′ then
(O is (M,M ′)-stable) =⇒ O 6= (D1,∞).
On the other hand, if s− sound(M,M ′) then the string
G := (D1,∞) ∈ O
has property sC(M,M ′). In particular if s− sound(M) then G has property sC(M,M ′) for all M ′.
Proof. This is mostly analogous to the proof of Theorem 2.13. Suppose not and let M ′ be such that
ΘM,M ′ ∧ sound(M,M ′) and such that for some m0:
M(M ′,m0) = (G,+) and G is (M,M ′)-stable,
with G consequently having property sC(M,M ′).
If we set I = (M ′,m0), then by G having property sC(M,M ′), by ∗M ′(I) → (G,+), G ∈ O since
ΘM,M ′ and by G being M ′-stable as G is (M,M ′)-stable:
D1(∞,m0) = D1 ◦R ◦ M˜ ′(I).
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On the other hand:
D1 ◦R ◦ M˜ ′(I) = D1 ◦R(D1,∞,m0) by M ′(I) = (G,+),
D1 ◦R(D1,∞,m0) = 2 by property G of R and by (2.2),
D1(∞,m0) = 1,
1 = 2.
So we obtain a contradiction.
We now verify the second part of the theorem. Given M ′ ∈ T0, for any m ∈ N, if I = (M ′,m) we
show that:
(3.7) s− sound(M,M ′)∧ (pr ◦M ′(I) ∈ O)∧ (pr ◦M ′(I) is M ′-stable)∧ΘM,M ′ =⇒ R(M˜ ′(I)) =∞.
Suppose otherwise that for some m0 and I0 = (M ′,m0) we have:
s−sound(M,M ′)∧(∗M ′(I0) halts)∧(pr◦M ′(I0) ∈ O)∧(pr◦M ′(I0) is M ′-stable)∧ΘM,M ′∧(R(M˜ ′(I0)) 6=∞).
Then by the above condition we get:
(3.8) ∗M ′(I0)→ (O,+), or ∗M ′(I0)→ (O,−),
for some O = (X,Σ) ∈ O, which is (M,M ′)-stable, and with property sC(M,M ′). We can of course
guarantee that there is some m′0 with M
′(M ′,m′0) = (O,+), but we arranged the details so that this
is not necessary.
Since R is defined on all of O′ we get:
R(M˜ ′(I0)) = R(O,m0) = X(Σ,m0) = x ∈ Z, for some x,
by Property G of R and by R(M˜ ′(I0)) 6=∞. Then we have:
x = X(Σ,m0) = D1 ◦R ◦ M˜ ′(I0) = D1(x) = x+ 1,
by (X,Σ) having property sC(M,M ′), and by (3.8). So we get a contradiction and (3.7) follows. Our
conclusion readily follows. 
4. A system with a human subject S as a machine in M±
Let S be a human subject in an isolated environment as before. S will be now assumed to be
idealized so that their brain is not subject to deterioration, and so that S aware of this. We may then
suppose as in Section 2.2 that S determines an element of M±:
S : I → Strings× {±}.
As S now denotes two things: the human subject and the corresponding machine, we will say physical
S when we want to clarify that we are talking of the actual (idealized) human.
Definition 4.1. As before, we say that the physical S is computable if the corresponding machine
S above is computable.
4.1. Additional assumptions. We now add the following additional assumptions. For any fixed
T ∈ T ±, we assume that the list {S(T,m)}n is complete, in the sense that if the physical S eventually
stably asserts that some O has property sC(S, T ) then
S(T,m) = (O,+)
for some m, and moreover O is (S, T )-stable. Here, “stably asserts”, analogously to previous usage
means, means that S is never to change their mind on this.
We also ask that the physical S stably asserts that they are fundamentally sound, which in the
specific setting here means that S stably asserts s− sound(S).
It appears to be completely rational now for the physical S to stably assert s − sound(S), given
our idealization. For S is simply asserting that the list of things, that they assert to have a certain
property, converges in the exact sense above to a list of things which actually have this property. For
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example I assert in absolute faith L: 5 is an odd number. This statement L is likely stably on my list,
unless I would have lost my sanity and hence would no longer be me.
If the reader does not like the idealization above, then they may replace S by “the evolving scientific
community” C, as we have already mentioned in the introduction. The fact it is “evolving”, because
its members change, presents no problems. If each individual human is Turing computable, then so is
this C. So we may apply the theorem below to this C, and if we contend that C is stably sound we
must conclude that humans are not computable, in the sense of this paper.
Theorem 4.2.
S is computable =⇒ ¬s− sound(S).
That is if our physical S is computable, they cannot be fundamentally sound, specifically meaning stably
sound. In fact we prove more, for any S′ ∈ T ±:
ΘS,S′ =⇒ ¬s− sound(S, S′).
This formalizes Theorem 0.1.
Proof. Suppose ΘS,S′ for some S′ ∈ T ±. Suppose in addition s− sound(S, S′). Then by Theorem 3.6
for all m s.t. pr ◦ S(S′,m) is (S, S′)-stable:
S(S′,m) 6= (D1,∞,+).
On the other hand S stably asserts s − sound(S) and hence must stably assert that G = (D1,∞)
has property sC(S, S′), by the second half of Theorem 3.6. In particular G must be on the list
{pr ◦ S(S′,m)}m, by the additional assumptions above, and moreover G is (S, S′)-stable since by
assumption S asserts s− sound(S) stably. So we have reached a contradiction. 
5. Formal system interpretation
Theorem 4.2, allows us to conclude that if S is computable then they are not stably sound. The one
string G that S is guaranteed to stably print, which expresses unsoundness of S, is fairly technically
elementary, but at the same time slightly esoteric. Can we see more clearly that S is unsound? Yes,
but we need stronger assumptions, and some language of formal systems. This section can be safely
omitted as it is only of secondary interest.
For simplicity we will base everything of standard set theory ST (Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms). Turing
machines, and arithmetic are assumed to be naturally formalized in ST . In what follows, for a
statement L, F ` L means that L is provable in the formal system F .
Let A denote the set of sentences of arithmetic, as formalized by ST . Let
P : N→ A× {+,−},
be a machine associated to the physical S, analogously to the previous discussion, and as in the
preamble to Section 3.
Definition 5.1. We will say that the physical S is captured by a formal system F ⊃ ST if the
following are satisfied:
(1) For any T ∈ T ±, and S denoting the partial function in M± associated to the physical S as
before:
(O is (S, T )-stable) ⇐⇒ F ` (O has property sC(S, T )).
(2)
(A ∈ A is P -stable) ⇐⇒ (A is a statement) ∧ (F ` A).
Let Con(S) denote the meta-statement:
∃F : (F ⊃ ST s.t. F captures S) ∧ (F is consistent).
Theorem 5.2. Let S be as above then:
(∃S′ ∈ T ± : ST ` ΘS,S′) =⇒ ¬Con(S).
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Note that ST ` ΘS,S′ does not mean that the physical S can prove ΘS,S′ in the practical sense.
It just means that after the terms S, S′ in the statement ΘS,S′ have been suitably interpreted in set
theory ST , ΘS,S′ is provable in ST . But a set theoretic, in other words mathematical, interpretation
of the term S may not even be practically attainable by the physical S, as presumably this necessitates
detailed knowledge of the physics and biology underlying the physical S. And even if this interpretation
was attainable, S may not be clever enough to find the proof of ΘS,S′ , again in the practical sense.
Also note that ¬Con(S) expresses fundamental inconsistency of S, as we only take stable assertions
of S above.
Example 3. Let S, S′ be as in the hypothesis of the theorem above, such that there exists F ⊃ ST ,
which captures S. Then F is inconsistent and so proves 0 = 1, and by the property that F captures
S, the physical S must stably assert 0 = 1.
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Let F(S) capture S as above, and let S′ ∈ T ±. By the proof of the second
part of Theorem 4.2:
ST ` (ΘS,S′ =⇒ L),
where L = L(S, S′) is:
∃m : (pr ◦S(S′,m) is defined and is (S, S′)-stable)∧ (pr ◦S(S′,m) does not have property sC(S, S′)).
So if provably ΘS,S′ , L is provable in ST and hence in F(S). On the other hand, by assumption that
S is captured by F(S), ¬L is provable in F(S). 
6. Concluding remark
While it can be argued that humans are not sound, it would be very difficult to argue that we
are not stably sound. Scientists operate on the unshakeable faith that scientific progress converges
on truth. And our interpretation above of this convergence as stable soundness is very simple and
natural. Thus our results put a very serious obstruction to computability of intelligence.
In addition, at least under the stronger hypothesis of Example 3, stable unsoundness is testable/ob-
servable, at least in principle. For if S′ provably computes S, then by Example 3 S and so S′ must
stably assert 0 = 1. Then as S′ is a Turing machine, we can simulate it on a powerful computer and
see if such non-sense strings really do appear. Given our basic understanding of humanity, such a
possibility seems too ridiculous.
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